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INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2003, citing increased competition in the new media
climate and pointing to authority in the Telecommunications Act of
1996,1 the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") voted to
change longstanding rules regarding the ownership of media outlets.2
The changes, the product of the most comprehensive review in the
FCC's history, relaxed regulations that limited the ability of media
entities to purchase additional outlets in their current markets as well
as their capacity to enter into new ones.3 The new rules increased the
1. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, states that in regards to existing regulations, the FCC "shall determine whether any
such regulation is no longer necessary in the public interest as the result of meaningful
economic competition between providers of such service." 47 U.S.C. § 161(a)(2) (2000).
2. Press Release, FCC, FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration 1, 3, at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-235047Al.pdf (June 2, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Republican Commissioners Michael Powell,
Kathleen Abernathy, and Kevin Martin voted for the changes; Democratic commissioners
Jonathan Adelstein and Michael Copps voted against them. See id. at 3.
3. Id. at 1, 4-7. For the purpose of this Recent Development, an individual
communications "market" is the community to which a particular media entity provides
information through a broadcast station, newspaper, or other medium. Part II.A uses the
term "media marketplace" to refer to all actual and potential broadcast media outlets in
individual markets across the United States.
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number of stations a broadcast network can own nationwide and
relaxed rules regarding cross-ownership of newspaper and broadcast
outlets in the same market. The vote also lifted restrictions on the
number of television stations one company can own in a particular
market.
The FCC developed the media ownership rules that generally
restrict the number and type of outlets a single firm can own mainly
to prevent excessive horizontal consolidation of ownership in
broadcast media.' Historically, the FCC's policy has been "to
encourage diversity of ownership in order to foster the expression of
varied viewpoints and programming" and to "safeguard against
undue concentration of economic power."6 In reshaping the media
ownership regulations in 2003, the FCC suggested that the limits the
rules set at that time on ownership of broadcast television stations
and cross-ownership of newspapers and television or radio stations no
longer served the public interest as set out in the Communications
Act.7 Nor did the preexisting rules serve the FCC's three policy goals
of competition, diversity, and localism.8 The 2003 changes, stated the
Commission, better reflected a modern and diverse media
marketplace where consumers view broadcast as a provider of one
viewpoint among many. The Commission also said the changes were
in the interest of promoting and protecting competition, which
provides consumers with a broader range of media choices.9
This Recent Development argues that the FCC's modifications
to the media ownership rules relied on an incorrect assumption that
media choices are substitutable and an empirically unsupported claim
that the changes are in the interest of competition. The FCC's
reconceptualization of scarcity on the basis of the substitutability
4. Id. at 4-7.
5. In the broadcast context, this Recent Development uses "horizontal
consolidation" to refer to a single firm owning a number of local broadcast television
stations.
6. Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d
17, 18 (1984), reconsidered, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985).
7. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,300 (local ownership
rule), 46,328 (national ownership rule), 46,312 (cross-ownership rule) (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73); Marc Fisher, FCC Tests Reception for Lifting Owner Limits,
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2003, at Cl. For an articulation of the FCC's mandate to serve the
public interest, see NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 221 n.5 (1943) (indicating that the
legislative intent behind the Communications Act was to give the Commission " 'full
power to refuse a license to anyone who it believes will not serve the public interest'
(quoting 68 CONG. REC. 2881 (1927) (statement of Sen. Dill))).
8. Press Release, supra note 2, at 1.
9. Id. at 1-2.
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among different media was inconsistent with past articulations of that
concept. ° The Commission also failed to develop a sufficient factual
record for the rule changes to survive judicial scrutiny. Part I of this
Recent Development briefly summarizes the FCC's rationale for
easing ownership restrictions and the legislative response to the rule
changes. Part II addresses scarcity, the principal rationale for
regulation of communications media. It explains how each side in the
battle over media ownership has constructed its justifications for
either decreased or increased regulation around its own conception of
scarcity. Part II also discusses why traditional media and the Internet,
one medium on which the Commission based its substitutability
rationale, are not adequate substitutes. Part III argues that the FCC's
rationales for its changes are arbitrary and capricious as that standard
has been defined in past cases.
I. THE 2003 RULE CHANGES
A. The FCC Decision
The June 2003 rule changes addressed concerns expressed by the
communications industry and by the FCC's own findings regarding
cross-ownership and the present media reality of consumer choice.
The broadcast networks lobbied hard for a change in the rule capping
the number of stations a network can own nationwide, claiming a
need to acquire more stations and other outlets in order to remain
competitive with cable, satellite, and the Internet and stating that the
rules in their current form deprived the networks from enjoying the
"efficiencies of consolidation."" In addition, the Commission relied
upon studies demonstrating that stations that received a waiver from
the FCC allowing them to own a newspaper in the same market have
shared resources, broadcast more local news, earned higher ratings,
and won more awards than stations in markets where newspapers and
10. Scarcity, the traditional justification for regulating communications media, states
that the government can regulate a medium to the extent the media's availability is
limited. See infra Part II.A (discussing the historical development and application of the
scarcity rationale).
11. See, e.g., Media Ownership (Broadcast Television): Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Mel Karmazin,
President and COO, Viacom, Inc., the parent company of CBS) (arguing that the FCC
should not deny broadcasters the ability to compete for customers and achieve efficiencies
from consolidation "at a time when Americans are bombarded with media choices via
technologies never dreamed of even a decade ago, much less 60 years ago when some of
these rules were first adopted"), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.
cfm?id=758&wit-id=2049 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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broadcast stations are separately owned.1
The FCC's 2003 decision affected three distinct media ownership
rules. First, the Commission changed the national ownership rule by
raising the broadcast networks' capacity for ownership of television
stations from a maximum of thirty-five percent of the nation's total
viewing audience to forty-five percent. 3 Second, it amended the
cross-ownership rule to lift the ban on owning a newspaper and
television or radio station in the same city in markets served by nine
or more television stations. 4 Finally, the FCC modified the local
ownership rule to allow one company to own up to three television
stations in markets with eighteen or more television stations and two
television stations in markets with seventeen or fewer television
stations so long as only one of the company's stations is among the
top four in ratings. 5
In its Order justifying the changes, the FCC acknowledged that
limiting horizontal consolidation of ownership of multiple media
outlets is the most reliable means of promoting "viewpoint
diversity.' 6 Viewpoint diversity is a policy goal that the Commission
traditionally defines as the availability to the consumer of media
content "reflecting a variety of perspectives."' 7 The Order affirmed
this goal and stated that the Commission believed that viewpoint
diversity fosters a robust marketplace of ideas, which serves as the
foundation for the democratic process.'8 However, the previous rules
prevented broadcasters from keeping economic pace with their non-
broadcast competitors, especially since cable and satellite companies
earn revenue from both advertising and subscriber fees while
broadcasters depend solely on advertising. 19 The FCC concluded that
broadcasters needed relaxation of the ownership rules in order to
survive. The FCC raised the cap to forth-five percent, reasoning that
while a national ownership cap was necessary in the public interest to
12. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,313 (citing THOMAS C.
SPAVINS ET AL., THE MEASUREMENT OF LOCAL TELEVISION NEWS AND PUBLIC
AFFAIRS PROGRAMS 5-8, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-
226838A12.pdf (2002) (finding that newspaper-owned station affiliates surpassed non-
newspaper owned affiliates in every qualitative and quantitative measure) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review)).
13. Press Release, supra note 2, at 5; Media Unbound, WASH. POST, June 3, 2003, at
A6.
14. Press Release, supra note 2, at 7; Media Unbound, supra note 13.
15. Press Release, supra note 2, at 4; Media Unbound, supra note 13.
16. Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,288.
17. Id. at 46,287.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 46,292.
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promote local content, the thirty-five percent figure was not necessary
to preserve competition.20
The FCC also found local ownership and cross-ownership rules
unjustifiable on the bases of competition, localism, and diversity.2 '
The Commission relaxed the local ownership rules, which previously
limited the number of broadcast stations an entity could own in a
local market, in large part because of the prior rules' reliance on a
now-antiquated notion that "only local TV stations contribute to
viewpoint diversity. '22  The Commission noted that previous
regulations did not adequately weigh how outlets other than
broadcast stations shape viewpoint diversity.23  The FCC also
replaced the cross-ownership rules, which prohibited the common
ownership of a full-service broadcast station and a daily newspaper in
the same area, with a rule that prohibited such combinations only in
markets with three or fewer television stations, finding that the rules
no longer promoted localism or diversity.24
B. The Legislative Response
Congress wasted little time in reaching across the aisle in a
bipartisan effort to undo the rule changes. In doing so, it acted on the
concerns of an ideologically broad coalition extending from the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to the National Rifle
Association.' Members of Congress were also responding to their
20. Id. at 46,328.
21. Since its inception, the goals of competition, localism, and diversity have guided
the FCC in developing its regulatory policy. In the media ownership rule change order,
the Commission affirmed its longstanding commitment to promoting competition under
the presumption that competitive markets will ensure the media consumer more choice,
lower prices, and more innovative service. See id. at 46,289. Regulating for diversity
ensures a wide dissemination of information from a range of broadcast sources; such an
environment, the Commission stated, is "the foundation of our democracy." Id. at 46,287.
And the principle of localism in federal broadcast regulation works to ensure that local
broadcast outlets are responsive to the needs and interests of the communities they serve.
Id. at 46,290.
22. Id. at 46,294.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 46,312. In fact, the FCC found that the cross-ownership rules may have
inhibited local programming since entities that owned both a station and a paper aired
more local news and public affairs programming. Id. at 46,313; see also SPAVINS ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 3-4 (finding that network owned-and-operated television stations
produced more local programming than affiliates). Such companies could draw on the
research and reporting assets of their newspapers to produce local programming and reap
economic efficiencies that resulted in higher quality programming. Broadcast Ownership
Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,313.
25. Stephen Labaton, Ideologically Broad Coalition Assails FC. C. Media Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28,2003, at C6.
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constituents' concerns, as represented in the more than 520,000
negative public comments filed with the FCC leading up to the vote.26
Conservative groups argued that the programming choices of the
largest media companies have a corrupting influence on the nation's
moral values and allowing those companies to expand their reach
would only increase that influence. 27 Liberal groups warned against
corporate control over access to news and the resulting reduction in
coverage of local issues. 2
8
The legislative response took a populist tone, even among the
Senate's most ardent supporters of big business. 9 On September 16,
2003, a resolution of disapproval, a rarely used mechanism that allows
Congress to overturn rules set by regulatory agencies,30 was
26. Jennifer Lee, Comments Showed Solid Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at
C8. The rule changes have received more public comment than any other proceeding in
the FCC's history. Stephen Labaton, Regulators Ease Rules Governing Media Ownership,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at Al; see also Stephen Labaton, It's a World of Media Plenty.
Why Limit Ownership?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, § 4, at 4 [hereinafter Labaton, World
of Media Plenty] (estimating the current number of public comments filed with the FCC
regarding the rule changes at more than one million).
27. The NRA, for example, asked its four million members to voice their opposition
to the changes, which would give "gun-hating media giants like AOL Time Warner,
Viacom/CBS, and Disney/ABC" more control over the airwaves and allow the NRA's
recruiting and public relations efforts to be hampered by the aforementioned
conglomerates' refusal to sell it advertising. See Frank Ahrens, Unlikely Alliances Forged
in Fight over Media Rules, WASH. POST, May 20, 2003, at El.
28. See, e.g., Press Release, Center for Digital Democracy, FCC Deals a Blow to
Diversity and Democracy, at http://www.democraticmedia.org/news/june2.html (June 2,
2003) ("Fewer owners of the mass media means fewer voices will be heard .... ) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). Dissenting Commissioner Michael Copps's
statement spoke directly to these concerns, declaring that the rule changes "empower[ed]
America's new Media Elite with unacceptable levels of influence over the media on which
our society and our democracy so heavily depend" and ceded "gatekeeper control" over
media information to private interests as well as "veto power over the majority of what we
and our families watch, hear and read." Press Release, Michael J. Copps, Commissioner,
Federal Communications Commission, Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps,
Dissenting 1, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatchlDOC-235047A9.pdf
(June 2, 2003) [hereinafter Copps Statement] (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
29. Senator Trent Lott, a co-sponsor of Senate legislation to roll back the
Commission's changes, stated from the Senate floor, "I am not one who thinks big is
always bad." 149 CONG. REC. S11,388 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Lott).
However, Senator Lott voiced his concerns almost immediately after the rule changes,
warning that "[e]xpanding concentration of media ownership may be in the best interest of
huge Washington or New York-based media giants, but it would not be in the best interest
of Mississippi's smaller media owners or media consumers like you and me." Press
Release, Trent Lott, The FCC's Mistake, at http://lott.senate.gov/news/2000/0606.fcc.html
(June 6, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
30. Congressional Review Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2000).
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introduced by Senator Byron Dorgan3" and approved by a vote of
fifty-five to forty.32 The Senate Commerce Committee also adopted a
bill that amended the language of the 1934 Communications Act to
preserve the thirty-five percent ownership cap.33 After the House
attached a measure to an appropriations bill effectively preventing
the national ownership cap change from going into effect,'M the House
and Senate eventually compromised at a figure of thirty-nine percent
for the national ownership cap, amending the cap language in the
original Telecommunications Act.35 The legislation did not address
the Commission's revisions to the local ownership and cross-
ownership rules. However, on September 3, 2003, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals stayed the local ownership and cross-ownership
rule changes while it considered a challenge from a group of
independent radio station operators.36
II. THE NEW SCARCITY
A. Scarcity as Historical Justification for Communications
Regulation
Historically, the principle of scarcity has been the underlying
rationale for governmental regulation of the broadcast
telecommunications industry. In NBC v. United States,37 the Supreme
Court recognized physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum as
the justification for the regulation of radio. As Justice Frankfurter
31. S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
32. 149 CONG. REC. S11,519 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003); see also Stephen Labaton,
F.C.C. Plan To Ease Curbs on Big Media Hits Senate Snag, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at
Al (reporting that twelve Republicans, forty-two Democrats, and one independent voted
in favor of the joint resolution).
33. Preservation of Localism, Program Diversity, and Competition in Television
Broadcast Service Act of 2003, S. 1046, 108th Cong. (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
34. H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. § 624 (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Christopher Stern & Jonathan Kim, House Votes To Prevent
Change in Media Rule, WASH. POST, July 24,2003, at Al.
35. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat.
3, 99 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West Supp. 2004)). The thirty-nine percent figure
represents the current national market shares of the two largest networks, CBS and Fox.
See Stephen Labaton, Court Is Urged To Change Media Ownership Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2004, at C14. This Recent Development analyzes the rationales the FCC put
forward in attempting to raise the cap from thirty-five to forty-five percent.
36. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL 22052896, at *1 (3d
Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (per curiam) (order granting motion to stay).
37. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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stated in upholding the FCC's regulatory authority to make licensing
decisions, "certain basic facts" about radio led to necessary
governmental intervention in the form of the Radio Act of 1927:
[Radio's] facilities are limited; they are not available to all who
may wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large
enough to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed natural
limitation upon the number of stations that can operate without
interfering with one another. Regulation of radio was therefore
as vital to its development as traffic control was to the
development of the automobile.38
Since the spectrum was not large enough to accommodate
everyone who wished to use it, Justice Frankfurter concluded that
"methods must be devised for choosing from among the many who
apply."3 9  Through the Communications Act of 1934, Congress
charged the FCC with making those decisions.4 °  The
Communications Act gave broad authority to the Commission to
regulate the use of the spectrum, in part by imposing public interest
obligations and restraints on private users.41 The scarcity rationale
has been similarly applied as justification for the FCC's regulation of
the cable industry.42
Since scarcity has been the guiding rationale for the federal
38. Id. at 213. The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, ch. 169, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162,
1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48
Stat. 1064, 1102, was the first attempt by the government to create a regulatory scheme for
broadcasting, making clear that the spectrum was held in public trust by the federal
government and loaned to licensees for use in the public interest. See JERRY KANG,
COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 68 (2001).
39. NBC, 319 U.S. at 216.
40. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064,
1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)) (creating the FCC and charging it to
regulate wire and radio communication).
41. See id. § 309 (a), 48 Stat. at 1085 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(a)
(2000)). For an excellent discussion of the history and context surrounding the passage of
the Communications Act, see generally Glenn 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications
Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1934, at 3, 3-24 (Max Paglin ed., 1989).
42. Cable is generally thought to have "medium scarcity" characteristics, a
combination of physical and economic limitations on its use inherent to the medium that
justifies the government's regulation of it. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 628 (1994) (stating that the fact that "the cable medium may depend for its very
existence upon express permission from local governing authorities" justifies regulation of
cable operators); Cmty. Communications Co. v. Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th Cir.
1981) (stating that natural monopoly limitations in the cable industry "make the cable
broadcasting medium 'scarce' in much the same way that the finiteness of the
electromagnetic spectrum makes wireless broadcasting a medium of essentially limited
access").
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government's regulatory authority over communications media, logic
dictates that where scarcity is not present, the government's
regulatory authority correspondingly decreases. Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo43 and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'
two cases in which "rights of reply" 45 were subject to First
Amendment challenges in broadcasting and print contexts, illustrate
this point.
In Miami Herald, a Florida newspaper challenged a state statute
that granted political candidates equal space in newspapers to
respond to printed criticism and attacks on their records." The Court
recognized the economic pressures inherent in the newspaper
industry, which had led to the failure of a great number of urban
newspapers, particularly in formerly competitive markets, and had
"made entry into the marketplace of ideas served by the print media
almost impossible."47  The Court also acknowledged that "a
newspaper is not subject to the finite technological limitations of
time" that serve as a barrier to allowing equal access in the broadcast
context.4 However, in invalidating the statute, the Court held that it
was incorrect and economically infeasible to assume that a newspaper
could expand to allow the government or other public figures equal
space in column inches to respond to accusations made in the press.49
More problematically, the Court observed, the statute could well
deter the press from covering political figures or issues for fear of
having to comply with a demand for access by an individual under the
statute. 0  Such government-enforced rights of access, the Court
stated, would dampen the press's critical role in facilitating public
debate under the First Amendment.51
The Court, however, held an analogous right of reply-the now-
defunct Fairness Doctrine52 -constitutional in the broadcasting
43. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
44. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
45. "Rights of reply" are statutes that grant public figures, such as political candidates,
a right of access to a particular medium in order to respond to accusations made by or
through that outlet. See, e.g., Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 244.
46. Id. at 243-46.
47. Id. at 251.
48. Id. at 256-57.
49. Id. at 257. The Court also found that such a right of reply statute violated the First
Amendment by infringing on editorial control. Id. at 258.
50. Id. at 257.
51. Id.
52. The Fairness Doctrine, originally adopted in 1949 and renounced by the FCC in
1985, required broadcasters to cover public affairs issues in the communities they served
and, more relevant to Red Lion, required broadcasters to provide reasonable
[Vol. 821490
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context. In Red Lion, a broadcaster challenged the Fairness Doctrine
when an author demanded the right to reply to a commentary
accusing him of working for Communist-affiliated publications and
making false charges against city officials.53 The Court explained the
constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine by stating that "differences
in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them. 5 4 Since broadcast access
was technologically and physically scarce and depended on
government regulation for its existence through the licensing of space
on the broadcast spectrum, it was subject to greater regulation than
print, which enjoyed a historical tradition of independence from
governmental interference.55
B. The FCC's Measure of Scarcity: Increased Choices for the Media
Consumer
Since the delivery of communications service is an inherently
technological practice, it would seem that advances in technology and
scarcity are inversely proportional. Spectrum scarcity decreases as
new technology allows more information to travel across the
airwaves. For example, with technological innovations that have
allowed for shared frequency usage, "refarming" of the spectrum, and
microwave communication,"6 the broadcast spectrum is both deeper
and broader today than Justice Frankfurter interpreted it to be in
1943.) Because physical scarcity decreases as advances in
communications technology increase, as technology continues to
develop, scarcity in the spectrum may effectively cease to exist.
However compelling the technology/scarcity dialectic argument
may be, the Supreme Court considered and rejected such a position in
opportunities for the presentation of both sides of those issues. See generally DONALD J.
JUNG, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THE BROADCAST INDUSTRY,
AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 1981-87 (1996) (surveying the history and eventual
demise of the Fairness Doctrine).
53. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371-73 (1969).
54. Id. at 386 (citing Joseph Burnstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
55. See CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ANOTHER LOOK 131 (2000) (observing that while a private
individual can start a newspaper in any city in the United States, provided he has the
money to do so, that same individual could not start a television or radio station because
of the licensing requirement for broadcast).
56. See generally FREDERICK J. DAY & HUONG N. TRAN, REGULATION OF
WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 109-215 (1997) (analyzing the historical
relationship between technological advances in wireless telecommunication and the
regulations promulgated by the FCC).
57. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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Red Lion. The plaintiffs in Red Lion argued that even if a lack of
frequencies existed at the time of the Radio and Communications
Acts' passage, "this condition no longer prevails so that continuing
control is not justified.""8 The Court responded by stating that while
technology has made spectrum use more efficient, as technology has
advanced, so too have uses for that technology.5 9 Even decreased
barriers to market entry as a result of technological advances did not
justify a departure from the scarcity rationale, the Court concluded,
because of incumbent broadcasters' experience and programming
advantages over new entrants.' ° Thus, arguments for spectrum
deregulation premised on a diminished government regulatory
interest in a less scarce, more efficient spectrum would likely fail
under Red Lion.6
The Commission's position in justifying the 2003 deregulation,
however, was not merely that technological advances have made the
broadcast spectrum less scarce and entry into the market easier.
Rather, the FCC argued that scarcity, as it had been understood since
the time of the Radio Act, has decreased because of increases in the
availability of diverse information to the consumer.62  The
Commission employed an "information" diversity understanding of
decreasing scarcity that measures scarcity in terms of content across
all media, rather than by each medium's natural transmission
limitations as Frankfurter defined scarcity in NBC.63 The rationale
was not based on how the government allocates a scarce resource
among the many who apply with the public interest as its guiding
58. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396.
59. Id. at 396-97.
60. Id. at 400 (listing "[l]ong experience in broadcasting, confirmed habits of listeners
and viewers, network affiliation, and other advantages in program procurement" as giving
"substantial advantage" to incumbents).
61. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (stating that
"although courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its
inception, we have declined to question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast
jurisprudence" and that the inherent differences in scarcity terms between cable and
broadcast justified differential treatment of those two mediums in application of a
standard of review under the First Amendment (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984))).
62. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,291 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) (stating that "today's media marketplace is characterized by
abundance ... [in] new modes of media" that have emerged since the establishment of
media ownership rules in 1941 and "have transformed the landscape, providing more
choice, greater flexibility, and more control than at any other time in history .... This
Report and Order [seeks to determine] the appropriate regulatory framework for
broadcast ownership in a world characterized not by information scarcity, but by media
abundance" (emphasis added)).
63. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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principle. Rather, the rationale of information abundance considered
the many other options in addition to broadcast available for those
applicants and for the consumer those applicants seek to reach. More
communications options for the consumer-in terms of the Internet,
cable, satellite, and other new media-lower government incentives
to regulate broadcast outlets in radio and television. Historically,
scarcity was tied to the limited availability of frequencies on the
spectrum in the case of broadcast or to the limited capacity for
market entry in the case of cable. The new media environment, the
Commission claimed in 2003, called for a reconceptualization of
scarcity on the basis of the abundance of content available to
consumers from various media outlets. As Chairman Powell was
quoted in the Washington Post:
When a rule was written in 1970, that was before cable TV or
anything approaching the Internet. What's happening now is
that technology creates many different platforms and means
of distributing news content in a way that is much more
dynamic and diverse, as opposed to [a time] when I say to my
kids, "Sit down at 7 p.m., turn on Walter Cronkite, we'll get
our news and go to bed."'
The unmodified ownership caps, Chairman Powell stated, were
black and white rules for a Technicolor world." With the public's
capacity to substitute among and across different media, the FCC
argued, concerns regarding concentrations of ownership in one
particular media, such as broadcasting, no longer justified outdated
ownership restrictions. Consequently, scarcity as to one particular
medium was no longer the appropriate overriding measure. As
Powell told the Senate Commerce Committee two days after the vote,
"today, news and public affairs programming-the fuel of our
democratic society-is overflowing. ' 66 According to Powell, the rules
required modification because they hindered consumer access to
diverse and local public affairs content and restricted broadcast's
capacity to compete.
64. Frank Ahrens, A New Era for Media Firms?, WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at El.
65. See Frank Ahrens, FCC Eases Media Ownership Rules, WASH. POST, June 3,
2003, at Al.
66. FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Michael Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-23511OAl.pdf (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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C. Imperfect Substitutes: Broadcast and the Internet
To justify deregulation of broadcast media, the principle of
intermedium substitutability requires media alternatives to broadcast
to be adequate substitutes. The increased viewpoints and diverse
content that new outlets like the Internet offer the media consumer,
the Commission's intermedium substitutability argument states, offset
any real or imagined reduction in the number of media voices that
concentrated ownership of local media outlets would cause.67 But this
Recent Development argues that the inherent differences between
the Internet and traditional media and the way in which the public
actually uses the Internet for news and public affairs information
show that the Internet's effect is not nearly sufficient to
counterbalance increased ownership concentration in broadcasting.
One major difference between Internet and broadcast in the
regulatory context is that the Internet bears none of the
responsibilities that broadcast outlets have to act in the public
interest. The government uses its scarcity-based regulation interest to
impose public interest directives on broadcast and cable, ranging from
the provision of public access channels' to children's programming
requirements.6 9 In contrast, Internet content providers have no such
obligations. The result is an environment that does not lend itself to
deliberative processes that the governmental and societal rules of the
media are designed to ensure.70
67. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,294.
68. See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (2000) (allowing a franchising authority to require a cable
operator to provide channel capacity for "public, educational, or governmental use").
69. See id. § 303(b) (stating that in deciding to renew a broadcast license, the FCC can
consider the extent to which the licensee "has served the educational and informational
needs of children through the licensee's overall programming, including programming
specifically designed to serve such needs").
70. The conceptualization of media's function under the First Amendment as a
supplier in the "marketplace of ideas" is well established in jurisprudence and scholarship.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (declaring that "[i]n the
First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to
fulfill its essential role in our democracy"); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (stating that diversity of news sources is a vital interest because
the "right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues");
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 27-28 (1991)
(finding historical support for the propositions that "It]he sovereign people needed
information and the ability to discuss freely how their government was performing" and
that revolutionary Americans "saw a free press as a 'bulwark of liberty' essential to their
newly created state constitutions"); Burt Neuborne, Media Concentration and Democracy,
1999 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 277, 279 (stating that consolidation of ownership of media
outlets results in private ownership over "the information marketplace in which we live"
and that such consolidation is "dangerous for democracy").
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In the traditional broadcast media context, courts have generally
interpreted the Constitution as granting the government the ability to
hush some voices in order to structure communication that protects
freedom of speech and enables a diversity of voices to be heard.71
The common law, the regulatory environment, and the traditional
media itself have developed a range of accountability rules and
practices from station identifications to the running of author
photographs alongside editorial columns that ensure the media
consumer knows the identity of the content's messenger.7 a These
rules allow the media to perform its primary responsibilities to
facilitate political speech and public discourse, to guarantee a
continued accountability to the public, and to "ensure[] that citizens
are socialized into a democratic political culture." 3
These media law rules and public interest norms do not operate
to the same degree in the Internet environment. Courts have
determined that the regulatory rationale of scarcity does not apply to
the Internet, and, therefore, the government's regulatory interest in
cyberspace is minimal.7 4 In addition, much regulation applicable to
the Internet would be considered content-based and would likely be
found presumptively invalid.75  The rules of accountability in the
media are likewise inapplicable since the often anonymous nature of
the Internet does not allow the media user to consider the source of
the content.76 The identity and the interest of the Internet speaker
71. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (holding that the FCC
can adopt regulations that choose one speaker over the other under its public interest
mandate); Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative Democracy in Cyberspace: The
Role of the Cyberlawyer, 9 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 20 (2003) (stating that the
government may curtail speech in order to protect freedom of speech).
72. Noveck, supra note 71, at 21.
73. Id.
74. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (distinguishing the Internet from
traditional media on the basis of the Internet's lack of both scarcity and a history of
regulatory restrictions on speech and stating that " '[e]ach medium of expression ... may
present its own problems' " (alteration in original) (quoting Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975))); see also Ryan Z. Watts, Independent
Expenditures on the Internet: Federal Election Law and Political Speech on the World
Wide Web, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECrUS 149, 159-60 (2000) (articulating how the Internet is
different from traditional forms of mass communication and how those differences are
manifested in the regulatory environment).
75. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 871 (concluding that previous cases provided "no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny" that should be applied to the Internet);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (holding that governmental
regulations that burden speech based on its content are subjected to "the most exacting
scrutiny" the Court applies).
76. See, e.g., Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New
Tricks: The First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1137, 1146-57 (1996)
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often remain a secret.77
The Internet also serves to diffuse the collective public attention
and interest that broadcast often focuses. Its nature points the user
toward more and more individualized use. Internet advocates point
to the proliferation of independent Web sites, or Web logs, as a
fulfillment of the democratic promise of the Internet.78 But arguably
the Internet's greatest success has been its capacity to create the
Market of One: individual information, delivered on demand,
specifically tailored to the individual user's needs, interests, and
desires. As Internet marketing becomes more sophisticated, less
opportunity remains for the shared media experience on which public
discourse is built. The content becomes narrower, focusing on
discrete topics for the benefit of self-selected publics. It aims to
capture viewers based on individualized preferences, rather than an
inclusive dialogue.79 Such an individualized dynamic of media use
runs contrary to the notion of a public interest.8"
In addition, in terms of substitutability, the Internet as media
substitute must be considered in terms not of its potential, but of its
actual use. The democratic model that the First Amendment was
designed to facilitate relies on the media to produce informed
participants who can add to the public debate; the media's efficacy in
this regard is measured by its actual effect.81 Studies of Internet use,
however, show that the majority of Americans online use the Internet
not to seek out diverse content, but as either a faster or more
convenient way to get the same information that traditional media
offers.
It is true that among those who use the Internet, the amount of
(stating the difficulties of applying traditional principles of defamation and obscenity to
the anonymous Internet environment).
77. Noveck, supra note 71, at 7.
78. See Matt Welch, Blogworld, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 20,
22 (declaring that Web log technology has "for the first time in history, given the average
Jane the ability to write, edit, design, and publish her own editorial product" for an
investment of next to nothing and that the Web log delivers on the promises of democracy
on the Internet that were heard in the 1990s).
79. See Fred H. Cate, Privacy Protection and the Quest for Information Control, in
WHO RULES THE NET? 297, 297-98 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. eds., 2003)
(discussing how the Internet's architecture makes it the ideal medium to create
personalized services).
80. See, e.g., Jay Rosen, Terms of Authority, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. Sept.-Oct.
2003, at 35, 36 (stating that the public consists of "the great mass of people spread out over
the nation but in touch with the same events, leading private lives but paying public
matters some attention").
81. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1411
(1986).
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time spent using the traditional media of radio and television
decreases.82 Internet users in 2002 continued to watch less television
than non-users83 and as Internet users gained more experience,
television viewing among those users continued to drop.M However,
despite evidence that the increased hours on the Internet come
directly at the expense of hours watching television, only forty-six
percent of those Internet users polled actually believed that the
Internet could help them better understand politics.85 Even fewer-
less than twenty percent-believed the Internet gave them more say
about what the government does.86 Significantly, over the course of
the three year study, these figures respectively stayed steady and
declined.87
The conceptualization of the Internet as an alternative media
outlet is also not a true indicator of how the vast majority of
Americans utilize it. Only thirteen percent of daily Internet users
stated they use the Internet for news or political information.88 This
population is less than the number of users who use the Internet to
check the weather (seventeen percent) or to look for information
regarding a hobby (twenty-one percent) and is about the same as the
percentage of users who look to the Internet for information about
books, movies, or leisure activities (thirteen percent) or to check
sports scores and information (twelve percent).8 9
While some evidence exists that the use of the Internet as a news
source increases during times of pressing public concern,90 there is
little indication that the public uses the Internet to seek out
alternative viewpoints, as the principle of intermedium
substitutability implies. A 2003 study by the Pew Internet and
American Life Project examined the nature of the public's use of the
82. UCLA CTR. FOR COMMUNICATION POL'Y, THE UCLA INTERNET REPORT:
SURVEYING THE DIGITAL FUTURE, YEAR THREE 33, at http://www.ccp.ucia.edu/pdf/
UCLA-Internet-Report-Year-Three.pdf (Feb. 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
83. Id. (finding that Internet users watched almost five hours of television less per
week than non-users).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 69.
86. Id. at 70.
87. Id.
88. PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, DAILY INTERNET ACTIVITIES, at
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports (last updated Oct. 22, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
89. Id.
90. LEE RAINIE ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET AND
THE IRAQ WAR 2, at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PIPIraqWarReport.pdf
(last visited Jan. 7, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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Internet as a media source during that year's war with Iraq. The Pew
study found that TV network and newspaper Web sites are the most
popular sources for online news.91 Of those Americans who went
online for war information, thirty-nine percent visited a network Web
site, and twenty-nine percent visited a newspaper Web site. 2
The Pew study's findings regarding the public's use of the
Internet during the war are also indicative of a larger point-that the
majority of Americans who use the Internet to find public affairs
information do so because of the Internet's convenience rather than
its alternative content. The picture here is of an office worker away
from the TV or a paper, checking CNN.com for news about military
movement or international developments or of an individual checking
the Web site of the local paper to follow election returns as they come
in, rather than of a discriminating media consumer seeking out
alternative viewpoints. Only four percent of users visited Web logs
for information about the war, and only eight percent visited
alternative news sites.93 Web logs in particular were visited far more
often by users less than thirty years of age with broadband
connections.94 Further, only seventeen percent of users said going
online gave them a different point of view related to the war; sixty-
four percent said the points of view on the Internet were the same as
those offered by the broadcast or print media.9
Perhaps the most troubling area in which the Internet is an
imperfect substitute for broadcast and other media is in the inequality
of Internet access that still persists. Whites are more likely to have
access to the Internet than African Americans or Hispanics; the well-
educated are more likely to access than those who graduated only
from high school; and the affluent are more likely to have access than
those who are less well off.96 The Internet is still not an available
substitute for a substantial minority of American media consumers.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5-6.
95. Id. at 7; see also Joanna Glasner, Media More Diverse? Not Really, WIRED NEWS,
at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,59015,00.html (May 30, 2003) (observing
that giant corporations own the top five news sites and that newspaper chains run three of
the next five most visited news sites) (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
96. See NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING
THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION 3, 8 (2000), http://search.ntia.doc.
gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); AMANDA LENHART ET
AL., THE EVER-SHIFTING INTERNET POPULATION 4, at http://www.pewinternet.org/
reports/pdfs/PIP_- ShiftingNetPopReport.pdf (Apr. 16, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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There are also particularly significant barriers to Internet use for
the persons with disabilities.97 Persons with disabilities have among
the lowest levels of access to the Internet of any population in the
United States. Of the sixty-two percent of those disabled individuals
who do not use the Internet, nearly half said that their disability
either impaired or prevented their use of the Web.9s Adaptive
technologies that are present in other media-such as closed
captioning, large-print, or Braille newspapers-are either not
available or priced prohibitively so as to make the Internet virtually
inaccessible.99
Media ownership rules are designed to ensure an adequate
number of diverse viewpoints in the marketplace. While the public's
expansive use of the Internet and other alternative media for public
affairs information may one day justify changing the rules that ensure
viewpoint diversity and allowing the same voice to own more outlets,
as of now the Internet simply does not offer a true substitute for
consolidated ownership of local television stations. Broadcast is still
by far the loudest voice.
D. The Cost of Ownership Concentration: Scarcity in the
Marketplaces of Media and Ideas
Like the FCC's content-based scarcity measure, opponents of the
FCC's rule changes in academia, public service, and the mainstream
media itself offered arguments premised on scarcity in speaking out
against the changes. However, the opponents' argument and the
argument that this Recent Development makes in opposition to the
rule changes speaks to actual scarcity of access in consolidated media
markets, not to the theoretical merits of intermedium substitutability.
The real products of consolidation in scarcity terms are increased
barriers to entry in individual media outlets and a concurrent scarcity
of diverse voices in the marketplace of ideas. Unlike the FCC's
rationale, which attempts to take scarcity off the spectrum, this
Recent Development's argument is tied to ownership consolidation's
likely result-increased barriers to entry to the broadcast spectrum
that defines the media marketplace, an already limited resource.
97. LENHART ET AL., supra note 96, at 5.
98. Id. at 30.
99. See id. at 32 (stating that adaptive technologies for the Internet such as magnified
monitors, head-mounted equipment, and large-button keyboards can cost up to ten times
as much as standard equipment and that speech synthesizers and Braille interface
machines can cost thousands of dollars).
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These effects justify maintaining current levels of regulation.1°°
In terms of competition, one of the FCC's three policy goals, the
inevitable effect of the rule changes is the creation of more, not less,
scarcity in the broadcast media ownership market. Centralization of
outlets in the hands of fewer owners not only displaces local
competitors who lack the resources to compete, it redistributes the
scarce resource of media outlets among a smaller pool of larger
owners. Despite the Commission's insistence that its changes were in
the interest of competition, they actually will have the opposite effect.
Incumbent conglomerate owners receive significant competitive
advantages over new entrants as those hoping to enter the broadcast
market must compete for fewer (scarcer) points of entry against
multi-unit owners with vastly greater resources. Dissenting
Commissioner Adelstein expressed concern that "small businesses
will encounter great difficulty in raising the capital necessary" to buy
media outlets, and because of the changes, small and minority-owned
businesses will find it "even harder in more concentrated and
expensive media markets to raise capital, own outlets or have their
unique voices heard." 10 1 Concentration's limiting effects on entry to
the broadcast media market are simply not offset by the relatively low
barriers to entry to the Internet.
Beyond the public policy argument regarding access, opponents
argue the rule changes will infringe on a core function of the media-
to inform and educate the public. Opponents predict that as
broadcast is deregulated, concentrated ownership of media outlets
will reduce the circulation of diverse opinions in the marketplace of
ideas. 102 Increased consolidation of ownership leads to fewer voices
in the exchange of ideas, making it more difficult for minority
100. Some commentators have written that the increased corporate interests in
broadcast requires concurrent increased levels of governmental regulation. See, e.g.,
TILLINGHAST, supra note 55, at 150-51 (arguing that "as ownership of media outlets ...
becomes more concentrated in the hands of large corporations, unless there is some
regulation of content by government, broadcasters cannot be trusted" to fulfill their public
interest obligations and therefore calling for, among other regulatory frameworks, a
reintroduction of the Fairness Doctrine).
101. Press Release, Jonathan S. Adelstein, Commissioner, Federal Communications
Commission, Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Dissenting 8, at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A8.pdf (June 2, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Commissioner Adelstein concluded that the
new rules will not just let large media companies get larger, they will effectively prevent
smaller entities from breaking into the market. Id.
102. Tom Shales, Michael Powell and the FCC: Giving away the Marketplace of Ideas,
WASH. POST, June 2,2003, at C1.
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viewpoints to be heard.103 As an example of the likely effects of the
rule changes, critics point to the effects of the deregulatory climate
following the 1996 Telecommunications Act.1" After 1996, the
number of radio station owners decreased by one-third, and large
corporate interests made diversity on the radio dial far scarcer by
pushing profits at the expense of localism. °5 Even allowing for
Chairman Powell's argument that technology and competition now
offer the public more media choices, these critics state that the
increase in the capacity for intermedium substitutability represents
not a decrease in scarcity, but the same voices, speaking more
loudly. t 6 While satellite and cable offer a multitude of channels and
the Internet offers news from around the world at the click of a
mouse, the opposition argues that those outlets are dominated by the
same handful of large corporations that control the presentation and,
in many cases, the production of content for broadcast outlets.
10 7
The opposition sees the rule changes not as appropriate
responses for an increasingly Technicolor world, but as a structural
mistake that will lead to an increasingly colorless media climate,
facilitating an oligopoly of media voices that has serious ramifications
for the democratic model of governance. Dissenting Commissioner
Copps looked at the rule changes and saw not many colors, but fewer:
"centralization, not localism; ... uniformity, not diversity; ...
monopoly and oligopoly, not competition.""0 8
103. Frank Ahrens, FCC Plan To Alter Media Rules Spurs Growing Debate, WASH.
POST, May 28,2003, at Al.
104. E.g., JERRY KANG, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 29-30 (Supp. 2003).
105. For analysis concluding that the Telecommunications Act's deregulatory effects
on radio ownership have been largely negative, see generally Michael Ortner, Serving a
Different Master-the Decline of Diversity and the Public Interest in American Radio in the
Wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 139 (2000).
106. See, e.g., TILLINGHAST, supra note 55, at 150 ("As for the 500 cable channels,
what if they are all owned by the same corporation, or even controlled by the same
gatekeeper? How confident in such an event can anyone be of receiving 'all' the
information one needs?").
107. See Fiss, supra note 81, at 1412-13 (arguing that market interests are inconsistent
with the production of public debate that democracy requires); Neuborne, supra note 70,
at 277-82 (arguing that consolidation of media outlets in the hands of a few corporations is
structurally dangerous for democracy); Labaton, World of Media Plenty, supra note 26.
But see HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 130 (1993) (arguing that an
Internet newsgroup is a mass medium since information posted onto the Net can
potentially reach millions, but differs from other conventional media in that unlike
television or newspapers, any member of the Internet audience is also a potential
publisher or broadcaster).
108. Copps Statement, supra note 28, at 3.
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III. THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE RULE CHANGES
Even assuming that the FCC's principle of intermedium
substitutability justifies decreased regulation, the FCC has not made
the case that its rule changes would ensure more efficient economic
competition. The Commission has not met its burden in showing how
its changes would have their intended effect on the media
marketplace.
The 2003 rule changes came about largely due to a series of
decisions by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. °" Two of these cases
in particular, Sinclair Broadcast Group v. FCCu0 and Fox Television
Stations v. FCC,"' articulated a standard for the FCC's biennial
reviews of its ownership rules under section 202(h) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.112 The Fox court, for example,
concluded that "202(h) carries with it a presumption in favor of
repealing or modifying the ownership rules."'" 3 The court interpreted
section 202(h) as allowing the Commission to retain a particular rule
only if it is "necessary in the public interest.""' 4 The court read 202(h)
as presumptively deregulative and held that the Commission failed to
show how the national ownership cap was still necessary in the public
interest." 5 The court also found the Commission's defense of the
local ownership rule in Sinclair to be arbitrary and capricious under
the Administrative Procedure Act116  and remanded to the
Commission for a more adequate explanation of the rule."7  In its
application of those cases to its then-existing rules, the Commission
read the court's interpretation of 202(h) as consistent with what it saw
as the legislative intent of the Act as a whole-eventual deregulation
109. The D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from Commission
decisions and orders. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2000).
110. 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
111. 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), modified, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
112. Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act states that the Commission must
review its ownership rules biennially to determine whether they remain necessary in light
of current market competition. 47 U.S.C. § 161. The Act instructs the Commission to
"repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest." Id.
113. Fox, 280 F.3d at 1048.
114. Id.; see also Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 152 (summarizing the holding in Fox).
115. Fox, 280 F.3d at 1043.
116. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000). The APA allows judicial review of agency
decisions on the grounds that an agency allegedly acted arbitrarily and capriciously. See
id. § 706(2)(A). The standard is usually interpreted by courts as requiring a rational
relationship between the facts found and the action taken by the agency. See Schurz
Communications v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 1992).
117. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 162.
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of the telecommunications industry."8
In complying with the court's remands in Fox and Sinclair, the
Commission developed a "Diversity Index" to justify its revision of
the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rules. The Diversity Index,
the Commission stated, "reflects the degree of concentration in
viewpoint diversity in local markets."'' 9 The Index also measured the
availability of various types of media and assigned a weight to each
class of outlet based on their relative value to consumers. 120 The
Index addressed the deficiencies the Sinclair court noted in the
Commission's rationales for supporting the caps, that is, the
"unresolved issues about the extent to which alternatives provide
meaningful substitutes to broadcast stations and are widely
accessible."''
By both changing the rules and attempting to provide a firmer
rationale for those changes, the Commission in effect threw the baby
out with the bath water. Rather than simply develop firmer
rationales for the rules, the Commission attempted both to comply
with the court's presumptively deregulatory reading of 202(h) and,
through the findings of the Diversity Index, to survive the arbitrary
and capricious standard the court applied in the former cases under
the APA.
In its decision to change the ownership rules, the Commission
overstated the presumption towards deregulation. It read the court's
directive for further consideration of the rules to mean the rules were
fatally flawed and unjustifiable, rather than that their justifications
contained insufficiencies the Commission could correct. The court
neither found the rules in question inherently unjustifiable nor
vacated them entirely, as the dissent in Sinclair called for 2 2 and as the
Fox court did to the FCC's cable-broadcast cross-ownership rule. 23
118. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,287 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) (stating that section 202(h), as read by the court, "appears to
upend the traditional administrative law principle requiring an affirmative justification for
the modification or elimination of a rule").
119. Id. at 46,317; Press Release, supra note 2, at 9.
120. Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,316-17.
121. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 160.
122. See id. at 170-72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority "fail[ed] to
fully appreciate" the statutory mandate of 202(h) and that since "the Commission
presumably made its best effort to justify the Local Ownership Rule, and has come up
short," the rule should be vacated).
123. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir.),
modified, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("Because the probability that the Commission
would be able to justify retaining the CBCO [Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership] Rule is
low and the disruption that vacatur will create is relatively insubstantial, we shall vacate
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This supports the proposition that the court considered the rules
themselves supportable under 202(h) and arbitrary and capricious
review, but simply saw the rules' justifications as insufficient under
202(h)'s deregulatory presumption and the APA's arbitrary and
capricious standard. 124 As dissenting Commissioner Copps stated,
Importantly, the court did not indicate that a relaxation of the
concentration limits is warranted or required. On the contrary,
the Commission could choose, if so inclined, to tighten its
ownership rules. What the court demands is that the
Commission provide more analysis and empirical data to justify
the rules it adopts.12 1
As discussed above, Fox and Sinclair are insufficiency of the
record decisions, not judicial mandates toward inevitable
deregulation. Even if a presumption in 202(h) towards deregulation
exists, such a presumption can be overcome with a sufficiently
developed showing that the rules were still necessary in the public
interest. Neither Fox nor Sinclair stand for the proposition that
deregulation pursued by the agency consistent with 202(h) is to be
reviewed under anything other than standard arbitrary and capricious
review. 12  The presumption does not relieve the agency of its
obligation to make rules that have a rational connection between the
facts before the agency and the agency's subsequent action, even if
the action is deregulatory.
The new rule changes are subject to the same arbitrary and
capricious standard under the APA that the D.C. Circuit applied in
Fox and Sinclair. It is unlikely that the Diversity Index justifications
underlying the new rules could survive such a challenge. In
undertaking arbitrary and capricious review under the APA, the
reviewing court must consider the degree to which the agency has
"offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency. ' ' 127 In terms of the Diversity Index, the
the CBCO Rule.").
124. See James E. Michel, Student Article, Embarking on Its Most Extensive Review of
Media Ownership: The FCC's Endeavor To Create a Happy Medium, 15 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV 249, 269 (2003). For another application of the APA "arbitrary and
capricious" standard to the FCC, see Time Warner v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 163 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (stating that all the APA requires is a "rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made" in order. for an agency decision to withstand APA scrutiny).
125. Copps Statement, supra note 28, at 8 (footnote omitted).
126. See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1043-45 (holding that the decision to retain the national cap
was both arbitrary and capricious and contrary to 202(h)).
127. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
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review would rely on the FCC's responses in its Broadcast Ownership
Rules Order to comments filed in response to its proposed
rulemaking and on the degree to which the Commission's responses
to these comments are nonresponsive, nonunderstandable, or even
nonexistent.128 There are areas in the Order where the agency failed
to meet this standard and did not provide a reasoned explanation for
its action in the face of empirical evidence brought by commenters. 129
For example, the Index uses a Nielsen survey conducted as part of an
altogether separate study to determine how consumers use different
media outlets for sources of news.13° An ex parte communication
filed by Media General critiqued the methodology of the Nielsen
study, questioning its usefulness in a rulemaking concerning cross-
ownership.' Rather than respond to these empirical concerns, as is
its obligation, the Commission merely stated that "the survey does, in
fact, help us establish an 'exchange rate' for converting newspaper,
television, radio and other media into common units so the
Commission can measure the extent of concentration in the 'market
of ideas.' "132 Likewise, a comment filed by the Consumer Federation
of America stated the Index was flawed because it did not consider
the degree to which consumers used different media outlets as
complements and not substitutes.'33 This criticism was dismissed by
the Commission as "not invalidat[ing] the premise underlying the DI"
since the goal of the Index is to measure the potential availability of
diverse viewpoints to the consumer.3 Such a response was itself
unresponsive to an empirical charge that the Diversity Index, by
counting each outlet as offering a separate viewpoint for diversity
purposes, does not consider the degree to which consumers use
different outlets for the same viewpoint.
The Index is also not a model of logical integrity and internal
consistency; many of its measures, including its method of analogizing
the total number of stations in a market to the number of choices for
128. Id. at 48 (stating that an agency must cogently explain in its rulemaking process
why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner); Fox, 280 F.3d at 1043 (holding that
the Commission's failure in 1998 to address contrary views the Commission itself had
raised in a report fourteen years earlier constituted arbitrary and capricious rulemaking).
129. Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding
that the agency may not act counter to the evidence before it and must give a reasoned
explanation for its action).
130. Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,318 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 46,319.
134. Id. at 46,319-20.
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local programming and public affairs programming, invite claims of
arbitrariness. A Diversity Index calculation begins by asking, through
a Nielsen nationwide survey, from which media individuals in a given
market get their local news and current affairs programming.'35 The
Index then divides the entire share of each medium by the number of
potential outlets in that given market to determine how many choices
are available to each consumer. 13 6 Such a methodology can lead to
arbitrary results.137 For example, should a nationally owned UPN
station with no locally produced content be considered a "choice" for
local and public affairs programming that is given the same weight as
a locally owned broadcast station with a local news department?
Earlier in its own Order, the Commission stated that the Diversity
Index "focuses on availability of sources of local news and current
affairs,"'38 yet the Index has no mechanism to determine whether an
outlet actually provides that particular kind of content. It merely
counts stations in a market and presumes that each of those stations
offer local content. The Index does not adequately address the digital
divide issues discussed earlier, nor whether the Internet is a true local
voice alternative or merely an alternative medium for the same
information. 39  Such interagency inconsistency earned the local
ownership rule a remand in Sinclair.'"
The court challenges to the new rules will not be the first time
the courts have scrutinized the FCC's rationale that decreased limits
on ownership better reflect the public's capacity to substitute among
different media. Despite Chairman Powell's statements implying that
regulation of the media landscape has been left largely unconsidered
since the time of Cronkite, the principle of intermedium
substitutability was considered by the court of appeals in Sinclair. In
135. Id. at 46,318.
136. Id. at 46,320-21.
137. See generally MARK COOPER, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., ABRACADABRA!
HOCUS-POCUS! MAKING MEDIA MARKET POWER DISAPPEAR WITH THE FCC'S
DIVERSITY INDEX 4, at http://www.consumerfed.org/abra.pdf (last visited March 26, 2004)
(identifying, among other illogical results, that the Diversity Index gives more market
weight in the New York City area to Dutchess Community College's television station
than to the New York Times) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
138. Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,318.
139. Supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text; see also MARK COOPER, CONSUMER
FED'N OF AM., MASS DEREGULATION OF MEDIA THREATENS TO UNDERMINE
DEMOCRACY 2-3, at http://www.consumerfed.org/FCC_- Rule.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,
2004) (expressing concern that the Internet is merely "a new distribution channel for
existing news sources" and that eighty percent of Americans still get local news produced
by newspapers and television stations) (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
140. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
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that case, the court looked at the substitutability rationale and found
the Commission's use of it to be inconsistent.141 The Sinclair court
remanded the local ownership rule on arbitrary and capricious
grounds, holding that while the Commission previously stated that
counting other media voices more accurately reflected the level of
diversity and competition in the media market for purposes of cross-
ownership (in a decision that was not before the court),142 the
Commission never explained why other media did not contribute to
competition and diversity for purposes of local ownership (which was
before the court). 43 Such an inconsistency in rulemaking was itself
inconsistent with the FCC's obligation under the APA: "to provide a
reasoned explanation for its action."'" In deciding the ownership
limit for the local ownership rule and what media outlets to include in
determining common ownership in a local area, the Commission did
not empirically demonstrate the degree to which intermedium
substitutability occurred in the media marketplace nor what effect
substitutability had on diversity as required under the APA.145
Whether the Diversity Index reflects the effects of emerging
alternatives in the media marketplace in a way that is not arbitrary
and capricious will be the essential issue in the challenges to the new
rules.
An additional rationale the Commission put forward in raising
the national ownership cap to forty-five percent is to ensure the
viability of broadcast networks by better allowing them to compete
with cable.'46 Loosening regulation in one media outlet in order to
allow it to compete with other newer markets, however, has a mixed
record before the courts. In Turner Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the
Court affirmed the basic principle laid down in Red Lion and
Tornillo-different media outlets merit different levels of
regulation.'47 The Turner Broadcasting Court acknowledged that
assuring the public has an array of media choices is "a governmental
141. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 163-64 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
142. Id. at 162.
143. Id. at 164.
144. Id. at 162 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
145. Id. at 164.
146. See Press Release, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that raising the national cap "protects
localism and preserves free television"); see also Media Ownership (Broadcast Television):
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., supra note 11 (providing
a broadcaster's perspective on the difficulties of competing with cable).
147. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994).
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purpose of the highest order.' 14 8 The Court also recognized the
importance of protecting homes with only broadcast from the loss of
television service from competition from cable.149  The Court
concluded, however, that in the case before it, there was a "paucity of
evidence" that broadcast was in danger of extinction due to the threat
of cable.15 °
The Turner Broadcasting Court remanded to the district court
for a fuller record since the Court could not "determine whether the
threat to broadcast television is real enough to overcome the
challenge" to the must-carry provisions brought by the petitioners.15'
No evidence was offered, for example, that local broadcast stations
had fallen into bankruptcy, turned in broadcast licenses, curtailed
operations, or suffered a serious reduction in operating revenues.
The government simply had not made the case that broadcast needed
its regulatory help in order to compete with cable.152 Without such
evidence, the "ensuring competition" rationale for lifting the national
ownership cap in order to allow broadcast to better compete with
cable by allowing networks to acquire more highly profitable local
stations could be considered arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
The FCC did not explain how a ten percent increase in the cap would
allow broadcast networks to compete better with cable, nor did the
FCC show actual harm to broadcast networks beyond declining
ratings or even market share. Similarly, in the 2003 rule changes, the
FCC failed to provide empirical support for the rule changes'
economic competition rationale as required by Turner Broadcasting.
CONCLUSION
In reconceptualizing scarcity and favoring intermedium
substitutability, the Commission must show that the alternatives to
broadcast offer truly accessible-and accessed-perfect substitutes.
Showing that technological developments result in an increased
diversity of speakers that will offset concentrations of outlet
ownership requires a rigorous consideration of more than just the
potential of that diversity. Current scholarship and research indicate
that such a showing cannot yet be made. So long as the majority of
Americans receive their public affairs information from broadcast,
requiring diversity of ownership in broadcast outlets is the best
148. Id. at 663.
149. Id. (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,714 (1984)).
150. Id. at 667.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 667-68.
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method of ensuring access to diverse viewpoints. By providing a
broad range of information, media performs its essential role of
enabling the public to make informed decisions and, thereby, serves
the public interest protected under both the Communications Act and
the First Amendment.
Rule changes in the interest of competition also carry an
evidentiary requirement. Even assuming a presumptively
deregulatory regime under section 202(h) of the Communications
Act, any deregulation must still be empirically shown to have a direct
and positive effect on competition. Without such data, any changes
to the existing ownership rules are arbitrary. A competition rationale
also requires data that show economic harm to broadcast because of
direct competition with cable and satellite (quantitatively possible) as
well as with the Internet (much more difficult). As a predicate to
deregulation, the FCC must show caps have a direct negative effect
on competition in the media marketplace that only their lifting can
remedy. Mere decrease in market share or ratings is insufficient to
show decreased capacity for competition. The FCC must
demonstrate direct economic harm, such as loss of advertising
revenue and decreases in network profitability.
To justify the ownership rule changes, the Commission must
perform two distinct and seemingly inapposite tasks: it must show the
alternatives to broadcast are both viable substitutes as sources of
public affairs information and a threat to its existence. By rigorously
favoring localism and diversity and limiting private ownership's
capacity to threaten those principles, the FCC can ensure the media
can perform its function of supplying information to the marketplace
of ideas. The administration of a publicly owned resource, such as the
broadcast spectrum, granted for use to licensees in the public trust,
requires no less diligence.
ENRIQUE ARMIJO
1509
